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This paper explores the Juncker Commission’s entrepreneurship when proposing the reform 
of the Economic and Monetary Union, asking whether the Juncker Commission was more 
entrepreneurial than the Barroso Commission and, if so, why. Drawing from discursive 
institutionalism and process tracing, I test the new intergovernmentalist thesis on the ‘decline 
of the Commission’ with its new supranationalist counterpart. The results show that the 
Juncker Commission has indeed proceeded in a much more supranationalist way than the 
Barroso Commission did, as a genuine ‘purposeful opportunist’ when it comes to the reform 
of the EMU. These changes are not due to structural reasons, as new intergovernmentalists 
would argue. Instead, it is found here that the causes lie within the process of the 
presidentialisation of the Commission and the deep pro-European convictions of Jean-
Claude Juncker. Building from these results, a call is made to introduce (or to further 
emphasise) presidential agency as a determinant factor in explaining the Commission’s 
preference formation and to beware of an overreliance on an abstract conception of the 



















This paper explores the Juncker Commission’s entrepreneurship regarding the reform 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Under the Barroso Commission, the Euro crisis 
was dealt with by the national heads of state and government gathered at the European 
Council; they took the lead role over the European Commission and proceeded often through 
means other than the community method. As Schmidt puts it, there was an obsession from 
European leaders with intergovernmental rules, numbers, and pacts. 1  Under the Juncker 
Commission, however, while no major reforms of the EMU have taken place (yet), a 
significant number of proposals to supranationalise the governance of the EMU have been put 
forward. This puzzle, which has received no attention in the literature so far, deserves to be 
explored: has the Commission become increasingly entrepreneurial? If so, why?  
In order to provide answers to these questions, I draw from the debate about the impact 
of the Eurozone crisis on the EU’s institutional balance. New intergovernmentalism has 
recently emerged and rapidly gained a large number of adherents, hypothesising that the 
European Commission acts as a run-down ‘strategic entrepreneur’. On the other hand, new 
supranationalists portray the Commission as a proactive ‘purposeful opportunist’.  
The analysis provided here, making use of discursive institutionalism and permeated by 
process tracing, tests these hypotheses when it comes to the ideational and advocacy roles of 
the Juncker Commission regarding the reform of the EMU. This paper does not pretend to 
settle the debate between new intergovernmentalists and new supranationalists but provides a 
new insight into it by covering the gap that exists regarding the Juncker Commission in the 
current literature. Therefore, I recognize that the observations made here are contingent upon 
the specificities of the case under analysis.  
                                                 
1 V. A. Schmidt, ‘Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the Numbers”’, 
in M. Blyth and M. Matthijs (eds.), The Future of the Euro  ¸New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 123. 
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1. Literature review 
The long-standing debate on who is the driver of European integration, which traditionally 
had pitted neofunctionalists (supranationalists) against intergovernmentalists, has been taken 
over in the last years by a more updated version between new intergovernmentalists and new 
supranationalists. Nowadays, both sides only agree on the fact that the European Parliament 
and the community method are losing significance in favour of more intergovernmental 
proceedings.2 3 Apart from that, while in the old debate both contending parts agreed that 
integration implied the delegation of powers to supranational institutions, new 
intergovernmentalism has challenged this view.  
 
New Intergovernmentalism 
While not claiming “to be a new grand theory of regional integration”, 4  new 
intergovernmentalism relies on a coherent set of assumptions and has been able to produce a 
useful ensemble of testable hypotheses, providing valuable insights on the role of the 
Commission in recent times. The main tenet of new intergovernmentalism is that, since the 
Maastricht treaty, Member States remain supportive of common solutions but refuse to 
delegate powers to supranational actors following the Community method.5 This integration 
paradox witnesses a delegation of powers to the so-called de novo bodies instead of traditional 
supranational institutions, such as the Commission or the ECJ, which could have fulfilled the 
functions delegated to the former. A paradigmatic example of this type of institutions is the 
                                                 
2 V. A. Schmidt, ‘The New EU Governance: New Intergovernmentalism, New Supranationalism, and New 
Parliamentarism’, IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 11 - MAY 2016. 
3  The community method refers to the ordinary legislative procedure, whereby the Commission initiates 
legislation and the Council (using qualified majority voting) and the European Parliament act as co-legislators 
and are subject to the judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
4 C. Bickerton, D. Hodson, and U. Puetter (eds), The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational 
Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 45. 
5 C. J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter, ‘The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-
Maastricht Era’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2015, Vol. 53, No 4. p. 705. 
3 
 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which provides financial assistance once countries 
have adhered to the (also intergovernmental) Fiscal Compact. 
When it comes to the role of the Commission, new intergovernmentalism argues that it 
has been side-lined by the European Council, which now takes “lead roles at all stages of the 
policy process, including agenda-setting, decision-making and, finally, the adoption and 
implementation of EU policies at all relevant levels of governance”.6 The main hypothesis 
here is that, contrary to what was previously believed,  “supranational institutions [such as the 
Commission] are not hard-wired to seek ever-closer union”.7  
This is not to say, however, that supranational institutions have no role to play. The 
point of new intergovernmentalists “is not to deny the role of supranational actors, but rather 
to acknowledge the fact that their relative importance in determining the character and 
direction of the integration process has been in question ever since Maastricht”.8 Far from 
opposing this trend, they argue, supranational institutions have often showed predilections 
towards it. 
In turn, they offer two possible explanations for this apparently contradictory behaviour. 
First, it is argued that supranational institutions act in a strategic way, which means that they 
will only engage in policy entrepreneurship that could benefit them when they think that the 
context is favourable enough as to expect an easy approval of their proposals. Hodson has 
argued that “the [Barroso] Commission acted strategically by steering clear of integrationist 
initiatives that were opposed by member states”.9 A second explanation can be found in the 
transformations that the institutions have undergone in the last decades. In the case of the 
                                                 
6 S. Fabrini and U. Puetter, ‘Integration without supranationalisation: studying the lead roles of the European 
Council and the Council in post-Lisbon EU politics’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 38, no. 5, 2016, p. 
482. 
7 Bickerton, Puetter and Hodson, The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht 
Era, op. cit, p. 712. 
8 Ibid, p. 706. 
9 D. Hodson, ‘The Little Engine that Wouldn’t: Supranational Entrepreneurship and the Barroso Commission’, 
Journal of European Integration, vol. 35, no. 3, 2013, p. 303. 
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Commission, the fact that its President is elected from the members of the European Council 
(Barroso and Juncker) could explain the preference of the Commission to find solutions in 
intergovernmental decision-making.  
Warren, Holden and Howell illustrate these hypotheses with the case study of the 
Barroso Commission and fiscal governance reform. Adopting a discursive institutionalist 
approach and carrying out an in-depth framing analysis of the Commission’s crisis discourse, 
they argue that the Commission acted strategically during the crisis by framing it around 
intergovernmental fiscal discipline. They conclude that, although the Barroso Commission 
argued in favour of a supranational reform of EMU governance in the long-term, it only did 
so as “a discursive strategy to mask a crisis response that at its heart is concerned with 
implementing intergovernmental fiscal discipline”.10 In their view, the Commission is not 
hard-wired towards supranationalism and, drawing from historical institutionalism, argue that 
a discursive shift will only come in the face of a ‘critical juncture’.  
 
New Supranationalism 
Against this theoretical backdrop, new supranationalism can be best assessed not as a 
comprehensive theory, but rather as an array of responses to the defiant claims made by new 
intergovernmentalist scholars. Unlike new intergovernmentalism, the new supranationalist 
literature has so far not produced a set of testable hypotheses regarding the nature and the 
drivers of European integration and often rely on previous literature. Although new 
supranationalists mostly agree on the fact that supranational leadership from the Commission 
and the ECJ has diminished, they vigorously reject the claim that integration does not imply 
the transfer of powers to supranational actors anymore, as can be seen with the Commission 
                                                 
10 T. Warren, P. Holden and K. E. Howell, ‘The European Commission and fiscal governance reform: a strategic 
actor?’, West European Politics, vol. 40, no. 6, 2017, pp. 1326.11 R. Dehousse, ‘Why has EU macroeconomic 
governance become more supranational?’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 38, no. 5, 2016, p. 617. 
5 
 
and the ECB’s roles in “strategic areas, such as macroeconomic policy or banking 
regulation”.11 
New supranationalist authors often resort to the interpretation of supranational 
entrepreneurship put forward by Laura Cram in in the 1990s, who saw the Commission as a 
‘purposeful opportunist’. In her view, it is ultimately “the Commission as an executive body 
which is responsible for the final phrasing and timing of the publication of policy initiatives, 
for establishing the opportune moment for action, and for the final selection of the instruments 
with which policies should be implemented”.12 As a purposeful opportunist, the Commission 
is “an organisation which has a notion of its overall objectives and aims but is quite flexible 
as to the means of achieving them”.13 In effect, it can use several instruments and techniques 
to make its policy acceptable. 
In this view, supranational institutions – especially the Commission – will try to expand 
the scope of their competences or that of supranational EU institutions in general, and will try 
to get their preferences reflected on the policy agenda. However, because of the normative set-
up of the policy making-process, the Commission cannot impose its preferences and needs to 
take into account the preferences of the legislators: “The Commission has learned to respond 
to opportunities for action as they present themselves, and even to facilitate the emergence of 
these opportunities”.14 In this sense, new supranationalist literature on the entrepreneurial role 
of the Commission refer recurrently to the notion of ‘windows of opportunity’. Moreover, 
even though the Commission might know its proposals will not gather enough support from 
other institutions or from the Member States, it may still push forward with concrete measures 
just to establish a precedent for future action. 
                                                 
11 R. Dehousse, ‘Why has EU macroeconomic governance become more supranational?’, Journal of European 
Integration, vol. 38, no. 5, 2016, p. 617. 
12 L. Cram, ‘The European commission as a multi‐organization: Social policy and IT policy in the EU’, Journal 
of European Public Policy, vol. 1, no. 2, 1994, p. 198-199. 




Finally, some recent contributions emphasise the importance of the Commission 
President in defining the institution’s leadership and course of action. Becker et al. contend 
that “the crisis did not cause a Commission retreat but accelerated a process already underway 
that finds its origins in the presidentialisation of policy control”.15 Thus, “the downward trend 
in the Commission’s decisional outputs was the result of concerted action on the part of its 
eleventh President, José Manuel Barroso, to strengthen presidential control over the 
Commission’s policy activism, especially during his second term, not displacement of the 
Commission by the European Council”.16  
 
2. Theoretical and methodological framework 
This paper employs discursive institutionalism as the theoretical framework and discourse 
analysis and process tracing as methodologies. In the same way as Warren, Holden and 
Howell, part of this paper adopts a discursive institutionalist approach and builds on their 
conceptual framework to categorize the discourse delivered by the Juncker Commission. The 
choice for this theoretical framework and methodology relates to the nature of the information 
available (primary documentary sources and interviews) and to the intention of allowing for a 
comparison between both studies. I extend the time span under consideration (November 2014 
to December 2017) and I evaluate the evolution of discourse through process tracing, the 
systematic examination of the unfolding events of a process over time.17  
The data used consists of policy texts like Work Programmes, papers and reports, 
Commission communications and proposals, European Council notes and conclusions. In 
addition, selected public speeches from President Juncker and from Commissioners Moscovici 
                                                 
15 S. Becker, M. W. Bauer, S. Connolly and H. Kassim, ‘The Commission: boxed in and constrained, but still an 
engine of integration’, West European Politics, vol. 39, no. 5, 2016, p. 1011. 
16 Ibid, p. 1013.17 D. Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing’, Political Science and Politics, vol. 44, no. 4, 
2011, pp. 823-830. 
17 D. Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing’, Political Science and Politics, vol. 44, no. 4, 2011, pp. 823-830. 
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and Dombrovskis are also analysed. The analysis of written sources is complemented with two 
semi-structured interviews: one with a senior official of the Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) who has been closely involved in the overall process of 
deliberation and in drafting some of the aforementioned documents; and another interview 
with a member of Cabinet at the College of Commissioners.18 
Discursive institutionalism puts the focus on the role of ideas and discourse in politics.  
Ideas are “the substantive content of discourse” and discourse is “the interactive process of 
conveying ideas”. 19  Schmidt differentiates two types of discourse, coordinative and 
communicative. Coordinative discourse takes place in the policy sphere and is played out by 
“the individuals and groups at the center of policy construction who are involved in the 
creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas”.20 Communicative 
discourse is directed to the public, political sphere and consists on ideas about the necessity 
and appropriateness of a given policy or set of policies. Due to space constraints, I will focus 
on the communicative discourse. 21  It deals with the “presentation, deliberation, and 
legitimation of political ideas to the general public”.22  
Warren, Holden and Howell provide a very useful and detailed typology of the two 
kinds of discourse to which the Commission could subscribe with regards to the response to 
the crisis and to EMU reform. They link individual policy frames to two different reform 
scenarios. The intergovernmental reform scenario frames the crisis as a problem of fiscal 
profligacy and suggests the “strengthening neoliberal fiscal discipline within EMU through 
the implementation of reforms building on the rules-based SGP framework”.23 Regarding a 
                                                 
18 Due to privacy and professional reasons I was not given consent to reveal the identity of the interviewees. For 
this reason, references to their positions within the Commission remain fairly vague and the interviews are not 
included as annexes. 
19 V. A. Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual Review 
of Political Science, vol. 11, 2008, p. 303. 
20 Ibid, p. 310. 
21 For a complete version with an analysis of the coordinative discourse, please contact the author. 
22 Schmidt, Ibid. 
23 Warren, Holden and Howell, op. cit., p. 1313. 
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fiscal and political union, this discourse supports the indirect channels of democratic 
legitimisation present in the Council of the EU and European Council, and only foresees a 
rule-based fiscal union. In contrast, the supranational reform model portrays the origins of the 
crisis as a balance-of-payments problems which originated through the accumulation of 
private debt and, due to bank-state interdependencies, spiralled to become a debt crisis. In this 
context, the necessary reforms imply a revamp of EMU’s architecture towards a more 
supranationalised governance system and the implementation of “neo-Keynesian fiscal 
solidarity mechanisms through debt mutualisation and/or the development of an enlarged EU 
budget function”. 24  In turn, such reforms would need new channels of democratic 
accountability and legitimacy, and therefore a full-blown political union becomes necessary.  
Finally, I will also examine what Pollack calls “the problem of agenda-setting, or the 
role of the Commission in the legislative process”.25 I analyse the Commission’s formal 
agenda-setting powers, which consists of the procedural capacities to draft and propose 
legislation. In addition, I consider informal agenda setting, “the ability of a ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ to set the substantive agenda of an organization, not through its formal powers 
but through its ability to define issues and present proposals that can rally consensus among 
the final decision makers”.26 
 
3. The Commission’s discourse and agenda-setting  
This section looks at two aspects of the Commission’s action. First, it delves into the 
communicative discourse presented by the Commission, its framing of specific issues, and its 
overall evolutionary process. Second, it refers to the conceptual divide introduced by Pollack 
between formal and informal agenda-setting. According to the European “institutional rule 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25  M. A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community’, International 
Organization, vol. 51, no. 1, 1997, p. 101. 
26 Ibid, p. 121. 
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governing the power to propose legislation and to control the agenda of a legislative body,” 
the Commission enjoys the role of formal agenda setter since it has the “monopoly of 
legislative initiative”.27 Has the Juncker Commission made use of its formal agenda-setting 
power to comply with the plan it sets up in its communicative discourse? Informal agenda-
setting is the ability to influence other decision-making organisations’ agendas by rallying 
consensus around a specific issue. For the Commission to attain such consensus, “a successful 
agenda needs to match and be securely rooted in the situative context of each presidential 
term”.28 Has the European Council picked up on the discussion and the proposals emanating 
from the Commission? 
The Five Presidents’ Report and Steps Towards Completing Economic and Monetary 
Union 
The beginning of the reflection process on EMU that characterized the Juncker 
Commission actually started with a request from the leaders gathered at Euro Summit who, on 
24 October 2014, invited the President of the Commission to “prepare next steps on better 
economic governance in the euro area” under the premise that it was necessary “to develop 
concrete mechanisms for stronger economic policy coordination, convergence and 
solidarity”.29 Interestingly enough, while in 2012 the Four Presidents’ Report had been tasked 
to Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council, this second time the European 
Council called upon the President of the Commission and not on its own President to come up 
with an input to reform the Eurozone. The work was to be carried out in close cooperation 
with the Presidents of the Eurogroup, the European Council and the ECB, that is, not in an 
independent manner but together with the other Europeans institutions except the European 
Parliament. The first outcome of this reflection process was an Analytical Note and the Five 
                                                 
27 Pollack, Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community, op. cit., p. 122. 
28 H. Müller, ‘Setting Europe’s agenda: the Commission presidents and political leadership’, Journal of European 
Integration, vol. 39, no. 2, 2017, p. 140. 
29 Euro Summit, Statement, Brussels, 24 October 2014.  
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Presidents’ Report, which were presented as a base for discussion at the European Council. 
Regarding a supranational discourse, the Analytical Note represents a timid first step, given 
that a balance had to be struck between the visions of its many authors. In a conciliatory tone, 
it defines the Eurozone as a “community of destiny… (that) requires both solidarity in times of 
crisis and respect by all for commonly agreed rules”.30  
Nevertheless, a major departure from the previous Commission can be observed, as it 
frames the Euro crisis in an unequivocal supranational way. Whereas Warren, Holden and 
Howell hold that the 2012 Commission’s Blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union framed the crisis “as a problem of fiscal profligacy”,31 the Analytical Note 
identifies the crisis as a financial one at the onset (originating in the US and an ensuing 
accumulation of private debt), which then developed into a sovereign debt crisis due to the 
negative feedback loop between banks and government sovereign debt. Moreover, it states 
that a differentiated policy making in the form of a centralized monetary policy and 
decentralized economic and fiscal policies can be a source of problems because the 
vulnerabilities of one country can spread to the whole Eurozone. 
In an undeniably supranational gesture, President Juncker “indicated his intention to 
draw on input from the President of the European Parliament in his reflections during the 
preparation of the [following Five Presidents’] report”.32 What was meant to be another Four 
Presidents’ Report thus ended up being a Five Presidents’ Report that now included the 
European Parliament. Building from the aforementioned supranational framing of the crisis, 
and despite the fact that it also had to be drafted in consultation with the Member States, the 
Five Presidents’ Report develops a more resolute and articulated discourse in favour of a 
supranational repair of the Eurozone. Delivered on 22 June 2015, the Five Presidents’ Report 
                                                 
30 J-C. Juncker et al., Preparing for Next Steps on Better Economic Governance in the Euro Area, Analytical 
Note, Brussels, 12 February 2015, p. 1. 
31 Warren, Holden and Howell, op. cit., p. 1317. 
32 Juncker et al., Preparing for Next Steps on Better Economic Governance in the Euro Area, op. cit., p.. 8. 
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lays out a roadmap to progress on the completion of the EMU in three stages and underlines 
in a supranationalist normative manner that “it is clear that the quick fixes of recent years need 
to be turned into a lasting, fair and democratically legitimate basis for the future”.33  
The first stage sets the short-term vision and is one where the status quo – composed of 
mainly intergovernmental measures – is to be maintained. Progressing in the Economic and 
Financial Unions is the top priority at this stage. Adopting a new-functionalist, spill-over logic, 
the Report calls for the completion of the Banking Union and the launch of a Capital Markets 
Union so that the monetary policy decisions can be transmitted uniformly across Member 
States. The completion of the Banking Union’s second pillar through the creation of a common 
backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the implementation of a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) that would make for its third and last pillar are deemed crucial in 
this regard and constitute a strong supranationalist plea. 
In its medium-term vision, the Commission aims at ‘completing the EMU architecture’ 
through far-reaching measures in the fiscal and political realms. The measures sketched out 
here are somewhat vague and the Report refers to their further development in Stage 2, which 
was set to start with the publication of a Reflection Paper in spring 2017. On the Fiscal Union 
side, the Report defends the idea that “public risk-sharing should be enhanced through a 
mechanism of fiscal stabilisation for the euro area as a whole”, which would be created under 
the community method and not be a mere instrument of crisis management.34 When it comes 
to the issue of a Political Union, the Five Presidents’ Report adopts an unambiguous 
supranational frame and proposes an increased involvement of the European Parliament and 
national parliaments in the oversight of EMU governance. 
                                                 
33 J-C. Juncker et al., The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, 
Brussels, 22 June 2015, p. 4. 
34 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Finally, the Report concludes in a clearly anti-intergovernmental fashion:  
the world’s second largest economy cannot be managed through rule-based cooperation 
alone [and that] a complete architecture (…) will inevitably involve sharing more 
sovereignty over time (…) within common institutions, most of which already exist and 
can progressively fulfil this task.35  
As regards the Commission’s formal agenda-setting, the Commission released in 
October 2015 its first package on ‘Steps Towards Completing Economic and Monetary 
Union’, which focuses on Stage 1 of the Five Presidents’ Report. The most salient proposals 
fit well the ambitions of the Juncker Commission. For example, in order to provide 
institutional strengthening in the governance of the Euro Area, the Commission tabled a 
proposal for a unified representation of the euro area in the IMF (an idea that had appeared in 
the Five Presidents’ Report), to be led by the President of the Eurogroup. Another relevant 
example is the Commission’s proposal of November 2015 to complete the Banking Union by 
creating its third pillar in the form of an EDIS.  
Looking at the Commission’s informal agenda-setting, however, its proposals have 
proved largely fruitless. Already at the European Council of 15 October 2015, EU leaders 
decided not to pick up on the Banking Union issue as developed in the Five Presidents’ Report. 
The case of EDIS, whose negotiations at the Council have been in a stalemate for years, is a 
another paradigmatic example. The derailed proposal for a unified seat at the IMF are also 
illustrative in this sense.   
The Reflection Paper on the deepening of the EMU and Further Steps Towards 
Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union 
In order to inform the medium-to-long-term proposals included in the Five Presidents' 
Report and to prepare the transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2 of the Report, it was foreseen that 
the Commission would deliver a White Paper on EMU by spring 2017. However, instead of a 
single paper, the Commission released a White Paper on the Future of Europe, accompanied 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 5. 
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by five more Reflection Papers focusing on specific issues: globalisation, social dimension of 
Europe, European defence, EU finances, and EMU.  
This set of documents represents the Commission’s strongest impulse to launch a debate 
on the direction of European integration. In its White Paper, the Juncker Commission 
considers that “the Lisbon Treaty, and the decade-long debate that preceded it, opened a new 
chapter of European integration that still holds unfulfilled potential”.36 The Commission sees 
the process of European integration in a clear neo-functionalist logic. It is indicative that it 
opens the White Paper with what is probably the neo-functionalist quote par excellence, a 
quote by Robert Schuman: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. 
It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”.  
Overall, given that the Reflection Paper on EMU is the sole authorship of the 
Commission, it is much more assertive and offers a much more detailed supranational 
discourse than the Five Presidents’ Report. It builds on the same interpretation of the crisis as 
the Analytical Note and the Five Presidents’ Report, focusing on an accumulation of private 
debt, the so-called bank-sovereign doom-loop, and a mismatch between monetary and 
economic and fiscal policies in the Eurozone. It also takes stock of the measures adopted in 
Stage 1 but argues that there should be no complacency with the intergovernmental steps taken 
so far, since “far-reaching legacies from the crisis persist and challenges for the euro area 
remain”.37  
In order to break the links between banks’ and sovereigns’ debt risk, the Commission 
argues for increased risk-sharing by completing the Banking Union. Apart from pushing for 
the adoption of EDIS, the Commission urges the creation of a credible fiscal backstop to SRF, 
                                                 
36 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, COM(2017)2025, 1 March 2017, p. 7. 
37 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the deepening of the EMU, COM(2017) 291, Brussels, 31 May 
2017, p. 12. 
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which would imply private risk-sharing in order to avoid costs for taxpayers, as happened with 
the intergovernmental measures taken during the crisis.  
In the fiscal sphere, the main supranational proposal is a macroeconomic stabilisation 
function for the euro area, brought about under the community method, to complement the 
national budget stabilisers in the face of asymmetric shocks. In the political sphere, the Juncker 
Commission frames the weaknesses of EMU governance in a highly supranational way. 
Regarding the legitimacy, efficiency and transparency of EMU governance, the Commission 
decries a piecemeal design of the EMU architecture that lacks an overall plan from the outset 
and argues that “too often [it has] taken the onset of a crisis to build the collective awareness 
and political will needed to act together”.38 For the Commission, the EMU’s institutional 
architecture is a mixed system composed of EU and intergovernmental institutions, “which is 
cumbersome and requires greater transparency and accountability”.39 On top of that, it is 
argued, “the common interest of the euro area is still not sufficiently represented in public 
debate and decision-making”.40  
With this framing of the EMU’s architecture, the fixes proposed are also framed in a 
supranational fashion. In the shorter term, the Commission suggests upgrading the ESM into 
a European Monetary Fund (EMF) that would also provide the last resort common backstop 
of the Banking Union. In the medium-term, in order to achieve greater democratic 
accountability, the Commission develops the idea of a permanent EU Finance Minister. This 
figure would thus strike a new balance between the Commission and the Eurogroup: while the 
Commission would remain the promoter of the European general interest, the Eurogroup could 
be given decision-making powers. Furthermore, in order to promote the general interest of the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 16. 




Eurozone, the creation of this Minister should also be accompanied with an increasingly 
unified external representation of the Eurozone (such as in the IMF).  
Finally, at a later stage, the Commission suggests the creation of a Euro Area Treasury 
entrusted with economic and fiscal surveillance (which currently is carried out by the 
Commission itself), coordinating the issuance of a European safe asset, and managing the 
macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism. Furthermore, it could also integrate the ESM once 
it is incorporated into the legal framework of the EU. The Commission proposes that the Euro 
Area Treasury be placed under the responsibility of the EU Finance Minister. However, the 
Commission is not blindly supranational when it comes to this Treasury and argues that, in 
order to ensure an adequate balance of powers between EU institutions and to allow for 
parliamentary accountability, decision-making would fall under the Eurogroup – composed of 
the Eurozone Finance Ministers accountable to their national parliaments. To sum up, in its 
Reflection Paper on the deepening of the EMU, the Commission propounds an array of reforms 
that would undoubtedly supranationalise the nature of the EMU governance to a large degree.  
The Juncker Commission exercised its formal agenda-setting powers via the 6 
December 2017 package on ‘Further Steps Towards Completing Europe's Economic and 
Monetary Union’. This package not only articulates the ideas set forth in the Reflection Paper 
on the Deepening of EMU but accelerates the release of some of them. 
Thus, the Juncker Commission has put forward a proposal to establish an EMF that 
would be inscribed within the EU legal and institutional framework, in order to ensure 
democratic accountability and full judicial control at the supranational EU level. Such an EMF 
would be able to provide the common backstop to the SRF and thus complete the second pillar 
of the Banking Union. Moreover, while the governance system under this new EMF is to 
remain in the hands of the member States through the Eurogroup, the proposal includes the 
possibility of reinforced qualified majority voting on “decisions on stability support, 
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disbursements and the deployment of the backstop”, 41  which represents an additional 
supranationalisation of the institution. 
In addition to this, the Commission has proposed to integrate the substance of the 
intergovernmental Fiscal Compact into EU law and thus make it subject to the community 
method. As a third supranational element, the Commission is calling for a dedicated Euro Area 
budget line within the EU budget which, among others, would provide for a Reform Support 
Programme and a European Investment Stabilisation Function. 
Finally, the Juncker Commission has proposed the creation of a European Minister of 
Economy and Finance, which is geared to reduce the complexity and to increase the 
effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the EMU’s governance 
system. This new Minister, who would be a Vice-President of the Commission and chair de 
Eurogroup, would be accountable to the European Parliament, pursue the general interest EU 
and euro area economy (not of the Member States) and represent it at the global level. 
Furthermore, being responsible for pronouncing on the adequate fiscal policy for the Eurozone 
in support of the monetary policy of the ECB, this new Minister would help reduce the current 
structural imbalances of EMU architecture, namely a centralized monetary policy and 
decentralized fiscal policies. 
To conclude with the formal agenda-setting efforts of the Juncker Commission, it is 
very important to notice the relevance of these proposals in terms of their legal nature. Even 
defenders of a new supranational assessment of the Commission argued that, during the crisis 
years (Barroso), while the Commission might not be in a general decline, “policy 
entrepreneurship in the classic sense – i.e. formulating and pushing for hard law – may be 
increasingly difficult in the current EU”.42 Despite this unfavourable context, however, the 
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Juncker Commission is not resorting to the use of soft policy instruments but to instruments 
of hard law, such as proposals for Council Directives and Regulations, when formulating its 
proposals. This is telling of the strong determination of the Commission to lead the legislative 
process and its engagement in far-reaching entrepreneurship. 
As regards to its informal agenda-setting results, while the Juncker Commission has 
managed to instil EMU reform as one of the top priorities of the European Council, a closer 
look at the dynamics within the European Council belies any enthusiastic and hasty 
interpretation. The day before the December 2017 package was released, a top European 
government official argued that “no one understands really why the Commission is doing this, 
it will be useless”.43 The European Council’s President Donald Tusk, in his remarks following 
the European Council meetings of 2018, repeatedly declared that the institution’s priorities 
regarding EMU reform consist on completing the Banking Union and enhancing Europe’s 
capacity to act by maybe transforming the ESM into an EMF.44 These two elements make up 
for a rather small sample of the Commission’s proposals. Proposals on the European Minister 
of Economy and Finance or a macroeconomic stabilisation function have hit a wall in the 
European Council. Effectively, as the leaders gathered at the Euro Summit of December 2017 
put it:  
The Rome Declaration illustrates our strong commitment to working towards completing 
the EMU. The Five Presidents’ Report from June 2015 contains a comprehensive set of 
reform proposals. However, while there is consensus on the overall goal, Member States 
differ in their assessment of what needs to be done, as well as in the urgency they attach 
to this task. In the absence of market pressure, the collective political will to make further 
progress has weakened.45 
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In the previous quote, it is highly remarkable that it purposefully avoids mentioning the 
documents and proposals released by the Commission in 2017; it instead refers back to the 
Five Presidents’ Report, which was much less ambitious as it did not exclusively depict the 
vision of the Commission. Moreover, after the Euro Summit of June 2018 it became clear that, 
while the ESM will provide the common backstop for the SRF, it will not be upgraded to an 
EMF under the community method as the Commission wishes.  
In conclusion, while the Juncker Commission has not been lagging behind the European 
Council when exercising its formal agenda-setting powers, if we judge its informal agenda-
setting as the capacity to provide “an idea around which bargaining can converge and in the 
absence of which no equilibrium position could be found”,46 then we can rightfully argue that 
the Commission’s Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the EMU and the December package 
have largely failed to meet the expectations.  
 
4. Strategic entrepreneur or purposeful opportunist: Revisiting the Commission’s 
entrepreneurship 
Bearing in mind that the Juncker Commission has firmly engaged in a supranational 
revamp of the EMU, the next step is to appraise the logic behind its entrepreneurial role – 
whether it fits more an intergovernmental or a supranational account. The commonality of 
both theories boils down to the shared recognition that the Commission’s entrepreneurship is 
dependent upon its environment. However, both theories have opposing views when it comes 
to the degree of external influence on the Commission’s choices and to the possibility of the 
Commission trying to shift its environment. For new intergovernmentalism, the Commission 
acts “as a strategic entrepreneur that supports integrationist initiatives only where they stand a 
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chance of success”.47 For new supranationalism, the Commission is a purposeful opportunist 
with clear objectives and is flexible regarding the means to attain them. 
As was shown in the previous section, most proposals released by the Commission have 
had a rather unenthusiastic reception, to put it mildly. It seems, nonetheless, that the likelihood 
of adoption was not the determining factor driving the Commission’s proposals. Announcing 
the 6 December package, Commissioner Moscovici argued that it was “THE package, 
obviously a cornerstone for this Commission”, and that, “even if some had preferred that the 
Commission does nothing (,) its duty was to act in a decisive manner”.48 The interview with 
the DG ECFIN senior official confirms this approach:  
That there was not enough support for a number of these proposals, that we knew, we 
expected it. I mean, if there was unanimity, it would have already been done ages ago, 
right? So, we are entering an area that is definitely controversial. But the fact that there is 
controversy does not mean that it is not the way to go, and you need to build up 
consensus.49 
In a similar tone, the member of Cabinet disregards any ‘strategic’ considerations, 
which they would only table proposals when the chances of success were high: 
Look at our proposal for the external representation of the Euro in the IMF. We proposed 
to unify the representation of the euro, and I am afraid the proposal has not progressed 
very much. So in a way, it is right to say that Member States keep their power, but this 
does not prevent the Commission from showing the way.50 
When looking at the Barroso Commission, Hodson had pointed out that the reason why 
the Commission was not supportive of supranational solutions to the crisis was due to a lack 
of appetite among the Member States for such measures. He argued that “the EU executive’s 
reluctance to play its hand over Eurobonds and a more supranational ESM are illustrative in 
this regard”. 51 We have just seen, however, that the Juncker Commission has been very 
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proactive, especially in proposing an EMF and a European safe asset, even in the absence of 
major support from Member States.  
The entrepreneurship of Juncker’s Commission thus seems to better fit a new 
supranationalist depiction than a new intergovernmentalist one. In order to fully accept the 
new supranationalist hypothesis, other ‘indicators’ have nonetheless to be assessed. First of 
all, the Juncker Commission, as predicted by the literature on purposeful opportunism and as 
we saw in the previous sections, has put its efforts into expanding the competences of the 
supranational institutions in the field of EMU. This is especially notorious with the proposals 
on the creation of an EMF, a European Minister of Economy and Finance, and a Euro Area 
Treasury.  
Secondly, the Juncker Commission has proven to be forward-looking. At the same time 
it recognizes the fact that although some of its proposals lack enough support at the current 
stage, the Commission attempts to set a precedent for future action. In this sense, the DG 
ECFIN senior official argued: 
Controversy is not necessarily a bad sign. The point is whether one is making the proposal 
that hits there where it needs to hit, and if you move from there forward. For example, the 
proposal for the Minister of Finance. There has been almost unanimous indications from 
Member States that it is not relevant for now. Let’s see, because it might become much 
more relevant before people realize, because at one point there might be an institutional 
political discussion on whether we have a legitimate governance structure, and this 
[proposal] might be the solution.52  
Thirdly, the Juncker Commission’s entrepreneurship on EMU reform dovetails with 
the vision of an organisation that has a clear notion of its overall objectives and pushes for 
them while picking the right instruments in accordance with its environment. Indeed, the 
Commission has been accommodative of its context to a certain degree by not proposing 
Treaty changes. As the member of Cabinet puts it: 
(…) if you read through the Political Guidelines [Juncker’s], there is a clear choice not to 
lose time, not to focus on Treaty changes or reviewing legislation. Why? Because it takes 
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ages, because it is not a priority, because the 6-Pack/2-Pack legislation was just starting 
in a way.53 
The formula picked by the Commission to integrate the EMF into the EU institutional 
framework is the one enshrined in Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU), the so-called ‘flexibility clause’, whereby no Treaty reform is needed. In so doing, 
the Commission has tried to shield itself against a potential backlash or an outright opposition 
to its proposals by Member States, who are currently reluctant to Treaty changes.  
Fourthly, the Juncker Commission has relentlessly advocated for its vision on how to 
reform the EMU by both taking advantage of windows of opportunity and actively seeking to 
create political momentum. This intentionality is most evident when looking at the reflection 
papers put forward by the Commission, which need to be contextualized in a situation where, 
since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has become a driving force of European 
integration.  
The Commission has rapidly managed to come to terms with, and even derive benefits 
from, this predominant agenda-setting role of the European Council: it has sought to push 
its strategic priorities through the European Council conclusions, via the endorsement of 
the reports/communications it regularly presents to the Heads of State or Government, 
corresponding to the initiatives that it plans to launch in the near future.54 
In this sense, it is illustrative that, unlike the 2015 Analytical Note and Five Presidents’ 
Report, the 2017 White Paper and the ensuing Reflection Papers were not requested by the 
European Council but were released under the initiative of President Juncker. The change of 
course from what should have been one Reflection Paper on the Deepening of EMU, as 
envisaged by the Five Presidents’ Report, to several papers is attributable in its entirety to 
President Juncker who realized, following the European Council of June 2016, that there were 
also other vital concerns for the EU other than EMU reform, such as migration, Brexit or 
external relations. 
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On 29 June 2016, in an informal meeting between the 27 Heads of State and 
Government and the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, the 
leaders announced that they were “starting a political reflection to give an impulse to further 
reforms, in line with our Strategic Agenda”,55 and pledged to come back to that issue at another 
informal meeting to be held in Bratislava in September that year. It was precisely between 
June and September that President Juncker came up with the idea of releasing a White Paper. 
Effectively, in his State of the Union address of September 2016, only two days before the 
Bratislava informal meeting, he urged for a ‘more determined leadership’ in Europe. After 
lamenting the existential crisis that an incomplete EU was undergoing, with a rooted paralysis 
and lack of ambition from many Member States, he declared: “(…) we need a vision for the 
long term. And the Commission will set out such a vision for the future in a White Paper in 
March 2017, in time for the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. We will address how to 
strengthen and reform our Economic and Monetary Union.”56 
On the whole White Paper process, the interviewed ECFIN high official offered this 
insight:  
The interesting point is that, in theory, there should have been a White Paper on 
EMU in March [2017] as a follow-up to the Five Presidents’ Report (…). Instead, 
it was decided to do one paper on the Future of Europe to cover not just economic 
issues. It became evident that the EMU was not the only priority in Europe (…). 
Certainly, the transformation of the debate from purely economic to a broader one 
has come from President Juncker.57 
In order to promote its own ideas on EMU reform, the Juncker Commission approached 
this agenda-setting process in a very individualistic way. In late 2015 it was said that the 
Reflection Paper would be “prepared in consultation with the Presidents of the other EU 
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institutions” 58  and also in “a broad consultation, gathering ideas from across Europe”. 59 
However, when asked about external consultation for the elaboration of the Reflection Paper, 
the DG ECFIN senior official pointed out that “input for us is very important…But then, OK, 
how to move forward?” 60  Instead, the authorship of the final document is purely the 
Commission’s.  
Unsurprisingly, the Reflection Paper is more assertive in its supranational tone than the 
Five Presidents’ Report. Overall, it has been a game of identifying windows of opportunity 
and trying to create political momentum. Already in early June 2016, before the European 
Council informal meeting later that month, Vice-President Dombrovskis called for the 
Commission to provide such momentum61. 
Indeed, the Juncker Commission repeatedly claimed to have created political 
momentum around its ideas. A clear example lies in its 2017 Roadmap for a More United, 
Stronger and More Democratic Union, where the Commission claims to have been entitled 
by the 27 national Heads of State and Government (gathered in Rome for the celebration of 
the 60th anniversary of the EU) to reify its preferred scenario of the White Paper on the Future 
of Europe – ‘doing much more together’ – by “affirming that ‘Europe’s future lies in our own 
hands’ and agreeing to ‘make the European Union stronger and more resilient, through even 
greater unity’”.62  
The same justification underlies the Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the EMU, 
where the Commission argues:  
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With the Rome Declaration signed on 25 March 2017, EU leaders committed to ‘working 
towards completing the Economic and Monetary Union; a Union where economies 
converge’. Now, this promise must be delivered. This requires political courage, a 
common vision and the determination to act in the common interest.63  
As a matter of fact, however, and as we saw before, the Reflection Paper was not 
endorsed by the European Council, which allow us to rightfully ask whether the Juncker 
Commission has actually succeeded in creating such political momentum and consensus 
around its ideas. 
The tabling of legislative proposals follows the same logic. The Commission launched 
its 6 December package under the argument that “the Eurozone is doing better economically 
and this offers an opportunity to prepare the future”, as Commissioner Moscovici put it.64 In 
April 2017, Commissioner Moscovici employed the term ‘window of opportunity’ for the first 
time, and since then it has become a recurrent reference.  
 Indeed, after the second round of France’s Presidential elections of 7 May 2017, which 
saw the victory of Emmanuel Macron with a strong pro-Europeanist discourse, Moscovici, 
when releasing the Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the EMU argued that “a window of 
political opportunity is opening in Europe65. President Juncker used the same discourse in his 
2017 State of the Union address: “In the last year, we saw all 27 leaders walk up the Capitoline 
Hill in Rome, one by one, to renew their vows to each other and to our Union. We now have 
a window of opportunity but it will not stay open forever. Let us make the most of the 
momentum, catch the wind in our sails. (…) We must complete the European House now that 
the sun is shining and whilst it still is”.66 
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In fact, it was during this speech that Juncker announced the preparation of the package 
to be released in December that year. Due to the assumed window of opportunity, the package 
actually takes a bolder stance than the Reflection Paper and sets out more ambitious proposals. 
In effect, when President Juncker declared “I believe the ESM should now progressively 
graduate into a European Monetary Fund”,67 he was actually going further in his ambition than 
the Reflection Paper, where the creation of the EMF had been left for the period from 2020 
onwards. Equally, when he affirmed that “we need a European Minister of Economy and 
Finance”,68 he was accelerating the roadmap of the Reflection Paper, which did not explicitly 
foresee the creation of such a Minister in the 2017-2019 period.  
For all this talk about a window of opportunity, the fact that the proposals put forward 
were not picked up by the European Council reveals that the Juncker Commission pushed for 
its agenda in trying to increase the momentum when the situation was not completely 
favourable. Indeed, the announcement to release the 6 December package was made 10 days 
before the uncertain German elections took place. The actual package came at a moment when 
French and German interests on the reform of the EMU, especially regarding the role to be 
performed by a revamped ESM, differed to a great extent. The situation was more problematic 
by the fact that there was no government in Berlin and that coalition talks between the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD were still taking place. Under these conditions, the European Council 
of 14-15 December 2017 was meant to focus energy on Brexit and not on EMU reform.69 This 
hardly matches with a context where the Commission could expect Member States to be 
receptive to, let alone supportive of, its proposals. However, as a top Commission official put 
it at the time, they “chose continuity” because they “couldn’t shut down politics just because 
there [was] a political crisis in Berlin”.70 
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When reflecting about windows of opportunity and the right time to deliver the 
package, the interviewed member of Cabinet provided a very useful insight to understand the 
approach of the Commission: “The Commission is very sensitive to national developments 
but of course it is not that there are elections all the time in all countries… So it is important 
for the Commission to play its role, which is kind of a driver of setting the agenda, expressing 
the general interest, putting options on the table, steering the discussion so that it progresses”71. 
Moreover, the interviewee noted the upcoming Euro Summit in December and the need for 
the Commission “to come with our proposals early, to shape the agenda for the coming 18 
months”.72 
To conclude, the Juncker Commission accurately fitted the portrayal of a ‘purposeful 
opportunist’ regarding the reform of the EMU. When a glimmer of opportunity could be felt, 
such as in the run-up to the Rome Summit of 2016 or after the French elections in 2017, the 
Commission purposefully acted to create momentum, using the very concept of window of 
opportunity as a discursive tactic to urge reforms, as a normative justification to stubbornly 
push for its supranational ambitions. The Juncker Commission has indeed not held back from 
presenting proposals that were lacking support or facing outright opposition since their 
inception. Moreover, this lack of support has not been regarded as a failure, but instead it has 
been considered as an effort to set the stage for the future. 
                                                 




5. Explaining the Commission’s entrepreneurship: presidentialisation and the figure 
of Jean-Claude Juncker 
It should be clear by now that the Juncker Commission has undertaken an entrepreneurial 
role that confirms the new supranationalist hypothesis. With this in mind, it is time now to 
respond to the second question set out in the introduction, that is, to explain the reasons why 
the Juncker Commission has played such a role: where does this reformative ambition come 
from?  
New intergovernmentalism puts forward various options for change regarding the 
entrepreneurial role of the Commission. Thus, Hodson has conceded:  
There is nothing to say that the Commission might not yet emerge as a supranational 
entrepreneur if structural conditions allow and/or political priorities are reordered. Indeed, 
the intensification of the euro area sovereign debt crisis in mid-2012 suggests that such a 
shift might already be underway, with Jose Manuel Barroso (2012) talking openly about 
the possibility of fiscal union and euro area.73  
While the Juncker Commission has emerged as a supranational entrepreneur, the pattern 
it has followed does not fit these indications. It was actually a few years after the crisis ended, 
when the waters were calm, that the Commission acted as a supranational entrepreneur 
precisely on the grounds that ‘the roof should be fixed while the sun is shining’. But the 
Commission’s political priorities and preferences are not the result of the economic situation, 
whether improved or worsened. As we saw before, the discourse on a window of opportunity 
was sometimes even more of a pretext to push its proposals than an actual enabling situation. 
Moreover, and as we saw with the December 2017 Euro Summit, the collective political will 
to make further progress had weakened among the Eurozone national leaders at the same time 
that the Commission emerged as a supranational entrepreneur. The Juncker Commission’s 
entrepreneurship has not changed neither due to structural factors nor to a reordering of 
political priorities. Furthermore, contrary to Warren, Holden and Howell’s historical 
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institutionalist argument, there is no indication of a critical juncture that could have provoked 
a change in the Commission’s discourse. The analysis provided here also rules out the tentative 
new intergovernmentalist explanation, whereby the fact that the President of the Commission 
used to sit in the European Council could imply a preference towards intergovernmental 
solutions over community method ones. 
An alternative explanation put forward by new supranationalism lies in the process of 
presidentialisation of the Commission, which in turn highlights the importance of the 
Commission President’s will and convictions in determining the outcomes of the institution. 
There is a growing literature on the transformation of the Commission’s internal organisation 
and the reinforcement of its Presidency, a process that began to take place already under 
Barroso’s first term. As Kassim put it at the time, the main change relates to the Secretariat 
General, which “metamorphosed at Barroso’s instigation from a service of the College into a 
presidential service, thereby giving Commission Presidency a capacity for control over the 
policy process lacked by even the most powerful of his predecessors”.74 
The intra-organisational reinforcement of presidential control over policy activism has 
been further implemented by Juncker. The appointment of Juncker as Commission President 
following the Spitzenkandidaten process – whereby the political families of the European 
Parliament nominated their candidates to preside the Commission – instead of being appointed 
as a compromise candidate by the European Council, explains a great deal of his determination 
to increase control over the organisation. Indeed, this process legitimated Juncker to claim 
personal authority on the Commission.75 
As soon as he was elected, Juncker started working on the transformation of the 
Commission to make it a top-down hierarchical organisation with a strong focus on vertical 
                                                 
74 H. Kassim, ‘A new model presidency: Leadership of the European Commission under Barroso (2004–2014)’, 
Berlin: PEU, 2013, p. 12. 
75  T. Christiansen, ‘After the Spitzenkandidaten: fundamental change in the EU’s political system?’, West 
European Politics, vol. 39, no. 5, 2016, pp. 992-1010. 
29 
 
relations. In order to implement his views, he “created a de facto hierarchy by giving the task 
to Vice-Presidents to lead so-called ‘project teams’: a group of several Commissioners 
working together on a related theme falling under Juncker’s 10 priorities”.76 Kassim et al. 
underline the importance of vertical relations within the College of Commissioners as a 
variable in explaining the President’s control over the Commission output, as well as the 
overall Commission’s policy activism. In their view, “horizontal factors, such as the 
distribution of preferences among individual Commissioners and bargaining between 
departments, have been secondary to this vertical dynamic”.77 
The European Commission has thus become a useful instrument for the materialisation 
of the President’s preferences. Already as candidate for President of the European 
Commission, Juncker saw it as his “key task to rebuild bridges in Europe after the crisis (…) 
and to strengthen democratic legitimacy on the basis of the Community method”.78 While he 
declared to believe in the virtues of intergovernmental response in certain moments of 
urgency, he claimed that the “democratic legitimacy suffered as many new instruments had to 
be created outside the legal framework of the European Union”.79 In order to palliate this 
deficit on the economic side, one of his ten political priorities was to deliver on a “deeper and 
fairer Economic and Monetary Union”,80 for example through the creation of a Eurozone 
budget and a unified representation in the IMF. As Kassim puts it, Juncker has undertaken a 
“radical overhaul of the Commission’s architecture (…) to create a political Commission that 
is capable of meeting the severe challenges that confront the EU”.81 
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We have just seen in a nutshell the arguments with which Juncker ran for President of 
the European Commission and pledged to transform the Commission’s policy towards the 
EMU. But, was such a change foreseeable? I will resort to the concept of “lived experience” 
as developed by interpretativist scholars and historians in order to assess the importance of 
Juncker’s trajectory in shaping his convictions about the EU. For Robert Prus, “the study of 
human behaviour is the study of human lived experience”, and “human experience is rooted 
in people’s meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions”.82 By digging into Juncker’s 
professional experiences and the interpretations and meanings he attributes to them, we can 
better apprehend the reasons why he has involved the Commission in the reform of the EMU. 
Since the early 1980s, Jean-Claude Juncker has held numerous highly salient political 
positions both at the national and the European levels. After being Minister of Finance during 
the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, he has been Prime Minister of Luxembourg for 
almost nineteen years and the first permanent President of the Eurogroup for nine years, from 
2004 to 2013. He has presided over the European Commission since November 2014. 
A significant feature of Juncker is that he has been considered the continuation of Pierre 
Werner’s vision on European integration, for whom he worked as State Secretary for Labour 
and Social Security for two years. It is a widely known fact that Werner, a committed 
federalist, “served as mentor and leadership trend-setter for [among other Luxembourgers] 
Jean-Claude Juncker”.83  
Werner had proposed in 1970 the first plan to create a European monetary union. While 
he adopted a neutral position during the elaboration of his report in order to attain consensus, 
Werner had previously adopted a “resolutely ‘monetarist’ approach”,84 which means that he 
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had advocated for the creation of a common currency and institutions before economic 
convergence was attained. The so-called Werner Report was a very ambitious one set out a 
three-phased approach to the introduction of the common currency, which later inspired the 
run up to the euro as planned by the Maastricht Treaty. The end phase of monetary integration, 
according to the Werner Plan, would bring about political union. As Chang explains, “unlike 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that established monetary union, the Werner Plan incorporated 
fiscal union as part of its plans for monetary union”. 85 With regards to the current President 
of the Commission, Juncker has considered himself to be Werner’s “spiritual child” and 
declared that “he taught me, and I have stuck to his teaching, that Luxembourg should always 
be part of the leading group among those who want more Europe”.86 
Juncker has throughout his career demonstrated several times his leanings towards 
increased European integration in a number of fields, and especially regarding economic and 
monetary integration. He has shown these ambitions even while being President of the Council 
or of the Eurogroup. The enlargement to the East, the largest enlargement ever in the EU, was 
launched during the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, when Juncker was 
President of Luxembourg. In July 2009, he unsuccessfully attempted to create a unified 
European chair at the IMF. In September 2010, while prime minister of Luxembourg and 
President of the Eurogroup, he made the case for upgrading the temporary European Financial 
Stability Facility into a permanent EU-level mechanism to manage future crises. Likewise, he 
repeated his calls for a unified Eurozone seat before the IMF and other international financial 
institutions.87 
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As Finance Minister of Luxembourg, Juncker had chaired the Council of Economic and 
Financial Affairs during the Maastricht intergovernmental conference that led to the creation 
of the single currency. Indeed, his role as an honest broker was indispensable in reaching an 
agreement for the establishment of the EMU. On the occasion of a public discourse in January 
2011 he regretted the fact that the Treaty of Maastricht did not result in a political union, as 
the Werner Report had wished for, and argued that “the single currency would be in a better 
state if a political union were already in place”.88 Already at that time, as President of the 
Eurogroup, he clearly argued in favour of solidarity measures within EMU:  
Europeans have not learned how to manage the single currency collectively and in a spirit 
of solidarity, and still fall into the old knee-jerk national reactions whenever difficulties 
start accumulating on the horizon, as we see all too easily now, when it seems almost 
impossible for the President of the Eurogroup to reconcile these two expectations — that 
there should be solidity, and that there should be solidarity.89 
In a similar vein in 2013, soon after the end of his term as President of the Eurogroup, 
he highlighted the need for a stronger democratic legitimacy in the EU, when referring to the 
euro crisis, claiming that “we are still far from a solidary and collective management of the 
euro to the extent that we have not yet gotten the real sense of our engagements”.90 
Already as President of the Commission, and in line with the position he defended as 
President of the Eurogroup in 2005 when the SGP was reformed, Juncker has called – this 
time invited by the European Council – for applying the rules with flexibility instead of 
dogmatically pursuing fiscal discipline. In this sense, he has been very critical of some 
Member States: “Being political is also what allows us to implement the Stability and Growth 
Pact with common sense. The Pact's creation was influenced by theory. Its application has 
become a doctrine for many. And today, the Pact is a dogma for some”.91 
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In conclusion, looking at Juncker’s extensive experience, it comes as no surprise that 
he has so strongly advocated for a supranationalist transformation of the EMU governance 
when presiding the Commission. His discourse on the reform of the EMU and the need for an 
increased democratic legitimacy is consistent with his lived experience and his convictions. In 
his 2017 State of the Union address before the European Parliament, where he presented, 
among others, his proposals to complete the architecture of the EMU, he declared: “this 
scenario is rooted in decades of first-hand experience. I have lived, fought and worked for the 
European project my entire life”.92  
 
Conclusion 
This work has reviewed the ‘decline of the Commission’ thesis as put forward by new 
intergovernmentalism, according to which “while the Commission has not been bereft of 
ambition since Maastricht (…), its energy has been directed at projects that involved few new 
transfers of powers to the supranational level”.93 Contrary to this view, when it comes to the 
reform of the EMU architecture the Juncker Commission has adopted a strong supranational 
discourse that has been accompanied by the corresponding legislative entrepreneurship, acting 
thus as a genuine ‘purposeful opportunist’ that is ‘hard-wired to seek ever-closer union’.  
Nevertheless, and while it still remains to be seen what decisions will be adopted by the 
European Council in Sibiu before the European Parliament elections of May 2019, it becomes 
increasingly evident that the Commission has largely failed to gather consensus on its 
proposals amongst the Heads of State and Government, who only foresee to complete the 
Banking Union and revamp a still intergovernmental ESM. This failure to gather support for 
its supranational ambitions, while not calling into question the ‘purposeful opportunism’ of 
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the Juncker Commission, could confirm the new intergovernmental hypothesis of an 
‘integration paradox’ whereby Member States remain supportive of common solutions but 
refuse delegating powers to supranational actors.  
The findings presented so far revert to the wider and unresolved debate on the EU’s 
institutional balance. This analysis, adopting a wider time span than previous articles on the 
topic of EMU reform, has revealed that absolute statements of the sort of ‘supranational 
institutions are not hard-wired to seek ever-closer union’ are too rigid to account for the 
Juncker Commission’s performance. This is not to say that the Commission has regained the 
central role it used to play in European integration and that new intergovernmentalists say it 
has lost. Pretending to make such a claim would even be futile because, in the end, and as new 
intergovernmentalists rightly point out, it will all depend on what Member States decide upon 
(as it always did), and it seems that for now they are not very keen on reforms that would entail 
a pooling of sovereignty and resources to the supranational level.  
We should avoid nurturing what Schmidt calls the “drawback” of the debate between 
new intergovernmentalists and new supranationalists, according to which “they are naturally 
more focused on demonstrating the significance of their EU actor than on shedding light on 
the overall picture”.94 What ought to be noted is that elevating the nature of institutions to the 
point where they become abstract entities upon which a unique behaviour and intentionality 
can be attributed, provides a misguided conceptual tool for understanding the behaviour of the 
Commission. It thus seems that the balance of powers between EU institutions and the 
behaviour of the Commission can be better explained by other factors that put less emphasis 
on the Commission as an abstract institution dependent upon an increasingly suffocating 
intergovernmental context.  
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This paper has attempted to introduce such a missing factor to explain why the Juncker 
Commission has acted in a clearly supranationalist way when nothing in its context gave 
grounds to expect this. The response provided here builds on the process of presidentialisation 
of the Commission and the strong European convictions of Jean-Claude Juncker. I have picked 
up on the literature that argues that the transformation of the Commission Presidency under 
Barroso and Juncker “has centralized decision-making power in the Commission, granting the 
incumbent far-reaching power over its policy agenda and action across and at all levels within 
the organization”.95 Looking at Juncker’s biography and electoral campaign promises along 
the Spitzenkandidaten process, there were reasons to expect that his Commission would not 
follow the patterns predicted under new intergovernmentalist hypotheses. The case of the 
Juncker Commission seems to confirm that “the Commission President’s political priorities 
and the State of the Union address increasingly set the agenda for the EU machinery”.96 
Hodson has called upon students of supranational entrepreneurship to further reflect 
upon how supranational actors form their preferences.97 A convincing response in this regard 
lies in the presidentialization of the Commission and the objectives of its President. Hodson is 
right in claiming that “[of course] Commission presidents do not make the political weather 
[and that] it remains to be seen whether Member States will support Juncker’s plans to reform 
euro-area governance”.98 However, it may well be that Commission presidents increasingly 
make the institution’s preferences. As Shepsle correctly pointed out when refelcting about the 
US Congress, referring to any institution as a unitary, abstract entity dissociable of who seats 
at its Presidency would be an oxymoron, that is, an inconsistent expression. 99 Therefore, more 
than thinking of the Commission as an abstract actor in itself (as the new -isms often do), it 
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would be better to refer to the Juncker Commission or the Barroso Commission, as the case 
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